HEURISTICS, HETEROGENEITY AND GREEN CHOICES: VOTING ON CALIFORNIA'S PROPOSITION 23
Ballot initiatives and referendums have a lengthy history and over the past two decades they have become increasingly popular ways for deciding a variety of important political issues. 1 Research on voting behavior in these events has focused on two broad classes of predictorsperceptions of the costs and benefits of the alternatives under consideration and the impact of heuristics or cues people employ to help them make their ballot decisions.
2 Regarding the latter, some analysts have hypothesized that the effects of heuristics are heterogeneous, being larger for people with lower levels of political knowledge. However, there are reasons to hypothesize that the impact of heuristics actually may be greater among more knowledgeable individuals. This paper investigates these alternatives using survey data on voting in an important recent ballot initiative in California. Rival hypotheses of interest are tested using statistical methods appropriate for studying interaction effects in nonlinear models.
In the sections that follow, we first discuss theoretical perspectives that have been used in previous research to explain voting on initiative and referendum propositions. After briefly describing relationships between preferences on California's Proposition 23 and potentially important explanatory variables, we specify and estimate a multivariate model of voting on the proposition that enables us to test competing hypotheses about how varying levels of political knowledge condition the effects of candidate image heuristics while controlling for other theoretically significant predictor variables. The conclusion summarizes major findings and discusses implications for understanding how voters make important political choices.
Theoretical Perspectives
One major theoretical perspective on initiative and referendum voting is that citizens assess the merits of the case and vote in favor of a proposal when they expect that the benefits of adopting it outweigh the costs (e.g., Johnston et al, 1996; Clarke, Kornberg and Stewart, 2004;  see also Alvarez and Kiewiet, 2009) . 3 However, if voters think costs exceed benefits or they are unsure, then they vote no. In this regard, uncertainty about the consequences of adopting a proposal to change the status quo is often used to explain a major stylized fact about such proposals, namely that they often are defeated (see LeDuc, 2003) . The claim is that, when in doubt, voters discount possible benefits and say "no." This latter hypothesis is consistent with widely cited research showing that in a wide variety of situations decision-makers have asymmetric loss functions which prompt them to weigh costs more heavily than benefits (e.g., Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982; Thaler, 1993; 1994) .
A second major theoretical perspective on initiative and referendum voting involves the idea that in situations of high stakes and abundant uncertainty people rely on heuristic devices of various kinds. Since pioneering work by Simon (1955; 1957) , decision-making using heuristics has been associated with broader theories of bounded rationality. The latter may have served to color assessments of this approach by implying that the use of heuristics involves an inferior decision strategy when compared to the familiar optimizing models of rational choice theory.
Indeed, Simon's term "satisficing" implies something less than global optimization (Conlisk, 1996) . Simon addressed these concerns by observing that the classical, optimizing model requires knowledge of all available alternatives, consequences and probabilities. It is a world without surprises (Gigerenzer and Gaissmeier 2011: 452; see also Gigerenzer, Hertwig and Pachur, 2011).
Simon's analysis is consistent with that of Savage (1954) , a major figure in the development of Bayesian decision theory. As noted by Gigerenzer and Gaissmeier, Savage differentiated between the perfect knowledge found in "small worlds" versus "large worlds,"
where relevant information is either unknown, or must be estimated with uncertainty from small F o r R e v i e w O n l y 2 samples. Thus, and critically, "one can no longer assume that "rational" models automatically provide the correct answer. Even small deviations from model conditions can lead to disaster when applied to the large world…" (Gigerenzer and Gaissmeier 2011: 453) . In anticipating arguments below, it reasonable to conclude that more knowledgeable and sophisticated people recognize the difference between "small world" and "large world" situations and are act accordingly.
Gigerenzer and his associates have been leading voices in making the case that simplifying heuristic devices may be superior to optimizing models of decision making and that, in fact, individuals rely heavily on heuristics when making a wide variety of decisions.
Gigerenzer (2008) argues that: (a) optimization is often impossible because of computational intractability or is less robust, i.e.; subject to substantial measurement error; (b) individuals with greater cognitive capacity are not less likely to employ relatively simple heuristics when compared to those with lesser cognitive ability. More information and intensive computation is not always better. There are many situations where making good decisions requires ignoring some available information. This argument is consistent with Savage's image of "large worlds" which are fraught with uncertainty and where probabilistic reasoning is pervasive.
Political decisions confronting individuals in contemporary settings are ideally suited to Gigerenzer's "fast and frugal" decision-making heuristics. Given the opaque nature of complex issues such as climate change and possible mitigating strategies and solutions, the uncertain nature of attendant political-economic trade-offs and serious difficulties involved in assessing the veracity of competing claims, a classical optimizing approach is likely not possible. The present paper focuses on citizen decision-making in important political initiatives and referendums. Faced with making a choice on an initiative or referendum proposal, and lacking reliable information about the consequences of alternative courses of action or the cognitive resources to process that information effectively, voters employ cues provided by various groups and individuals. As noted above, Gigerenzer et al. describe these cues as "fast and frugal heuristics," i.e., cues that are used by voters who typically are unable to behave in accordance with the precepts of classic micro-economic rationality. 4 One such heuristic is provided by images of party leaders or candidates who are proponents or opponents of an initiative or referendum proposal. Voters use information about the proposition's "friends and foes" in combination with information about these individuals and groups to decide how to cast their ballots.
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Elaborating this hypothesis, some scholars have conjectured that the effects of candidate and party leader images are heterogeneous, being stronger among people with lower levels of political knowledge (e.g., Bartle, 2005 : Gomez and Wilson, 2001 Mondak, 1993 ; see also widely: 22% rated climate change as "not important," the lowest possible score, and 17% rated it as "very important," the highest possible score. Other views were dispersed across the scale-41% rated climate change in the 0-4 range of importance and 49% gave scores in the 6-10 range.
Similarly, when asked about tradeoffs between environmental protection and economic growth, Californians were widely dispersed across an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (protect Trade-the idea was opposed 43% to 35%, with fully 37% expressing "strongly unfavorable"
opinions and only 17% stating that they were "strongly favorable" (data not shown). The second model specifies explicit interaction effects and is designed to test the two competing hypotheses articulated above concerning how candidate images interact with political knowledge to influence the choices voters make.
Multivariate Models of Voting on Proposition 23
Consonant with the theoretical perspectives on initiative and referendum voting discussed above, the two models incorporate variables tapping beliefs about the merits of the case, i.e., beliefs about whether a proposal, if passed, would produce what the voter considers to be a desirable outcome from a cost-benefit perspective. Specifically, we hypothesize that people with pro-environmental views would vote no, as would those who evaluate the economy positively. In contrast, people less strongly concerned about the environment and those judging the economy negatively would be likely to vote yes. We measure environmental attitudes using a factor score variable that summarizes information concerning attitudes towards Cap-and-Trade legislation, willingness to pay higher taxes to protect the environment, the importance ascribed to climate change and self-placement on a proposed trade-off between environmental protection and economic growth. 18 A second factor score variable summarizes information regarding national and personal economic evaluations over retrospective and prospective time horizons.
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The second category of explanatory variables contains heuristics voters might use as cues for making political choices. As discussed above, analysts often have argued that partisanship, Since the parameters in Model A are estimated using a nonlinear (probit) link function, the magnitude of the effect of any predictor variable on the probability of voting yes depends upon the values of other predictors (Long and Freese, 2014) . To provide intuition about the substantive importance of statistically significant predictors, we construct a scenario where all predictors are set at their means in the case of continuous variables, and at 0 in the case of dichotomous variables. Then, we vary each significant predictor in turn from its lowest to its highest value and compute the difference in the probability of voting yes. 29 The results indicate that environmental attitudes have a predictably impressive impact on voting on Prop 23. As these F o r R e v i e w O n l y 11 attitudes move from highly negative (anti-environment) to highly positive (pro-environment), the probability of voting yes falls by fully .81 points on the 0-1 probability scale. Liberalconservative beliefs also have impressive effects, with strong liberals being .41 points less likely to vote yes than strong conservatives. Comparative senatorial candidate images and economic evaluations also had sizable effects. As voters' images of the senatorial candidates move from strongly pro-Boxer to strongly pro-Fiorina or economic evaluations move from highly positive to highly negative, the probability of voting yes increases by .27 points. Other predictors are less powerful.
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Viewed generally, these results are consonant with the hypotheses that perceived costs and benefits and various heuristics both exert sizable effects on initiative and referendum voting. 
Candidate Image Heuristics and Political Knowledge
The preceding analysis documents that the images of senatorial candidates Carly Fiorina Consider an interaction effect in a binomial probit model involving two predictor variables:
where: E(y|X1,X2,X) = conditional mean of dependent variable Y, Φ = the cumulative normal distribution, X1 and X2 are predictor variables interacted as the product X1*X2 and XB represents the effects of other predictor variables in the model. Figure 4 which plots the Z scores for the interaction effects against the probability of voting yes. 38 Given competing hypotheses that the comparative leader heuristic x political knowledge interaction effects could be either positive or negative, these significance tests are two-tailed (critical values of Z = +/-1.96, p = .05). The shaded portions of Figure 4 show which voters have statistically significant positive interaction effects and which voters have significant negative interaction effects.
( Figure 4 about here)
The distribution of Z scores shows that a large number (270) The concave shape of the plot of interaction effect Z-scores against the probability of voting yes in Figure 4 also is informative. This pattern illustrates that candidate image x political knowledge interaction effects tend to be statistically insignificant when the overall probabilities of voting yes are either very small or very large. In contrast, the size of the interaction effect tends to increase as the likelihood of voting yes or no approaches .5. 39 Regressing the size of the interaction effect on the probability of voting yes folded at .5 shows that this relationship is very strong-the (folded) probability can explain fully 86% of the variance ( Figure 5 ). Substantively, this relationship is consistent with the idea that as various forces influencing a voter's decision on California's economic difficulties, some observers thought that voters might conclude that the bill was an unaffordable jobs killer. However, Proposition 23 was defeated by a sizable margin.
Hard times notwithstanding, a majority of voters were not ready to abandon AB 32.
As hypothesized in previous studies, the analyses presented above testify that cost-benefit judgments and various heuristics significantly influenced how Californians cast their ballots.
People who were impressed by the dangers posed by climate change strongly tended to vote no and those who were unimpressed strongly tended to vote yes. Economic evaluations were relevant too and, again, the effects were strong and straightforward. People who judged economic conditions negatively were more likely to support Prop 23 than were those who were more sanguine about the economy's current condition and future prospects. General liberalconservative beliefs and risk aversion mattered as well-people identifying themselves as liberals and those who were highly risk averse were more likely to vote no than were self- The analyses also shed light on how candidate heuristics influence political choice among voters with varying levels of political knowledge. Contradicting the hypothesis that more knowledgeable people accord less weight to candidate images, multivariate analyses indicate that the effects of Senatorial candidate images tended to be greater among more knowledgeable voters. These interaction effects increased in strength as the overall set of forces prompting a yes versus a no vote became more evenly balanced. The latter finding suggests that candidate image cues are apt to be emphasized by knowledgeable voters when they encounter what is otherwise a difficult decision.
Historically, most studies of voting in initiatives, referendums and general elections have assumed homogeneous electorates. Despite findings stretching back to Converse's (1964) much cited research indicating that political belief systems in mass publics vary significantly in content and structure, the assumption that forces driving political choice have the same weight for all voters remains widespread. 40 But the assumption is not ubiquitous-in recent years it has been challenged by researchers who hypothesize that the use and impact of heuristics varies across electorates. Consistent with this heterogeneity conjecture, present analyses indicate that knowledgeable voters tend to make more-not less-use of heuristics when faced with potentially important decisions such as the one posed by a ballot initiative to suspend climate change legislation in a period of economic distress. In addition, the statistical evidence suggests More generally, the present study illustrates the potential theoretical and practical significance of the "fast and frugal" heuristic theory developed by Gigerenzer and others.
Applied here to studying the determinants of voting on an important ballot initiative, these theoretical ideas may be very useful for understanding decision-making not only in direct democracy contexts but also to choice behavior in the larger set of political arenas where information costs are substantial and people are subjected to an array of competing and conflicting messages. .000
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. There has been a lot of discussion about same sex marriage in recent years. Which one of the following statements comes closest to your own view? Response categories: (i) By law, people of the same sex should never be allowed to marry one another; (ii) People of the same sex should be allowed to have a legally recognized 'civil union' but not allowed to marry one another; (iii) People of the same sex should be allowed to marry one another if they choose; (iv) don't know.
Defense Spending
Some people believe that we should spend much less money for defense. Others feel that defense spending should be greatly increased. On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'government should spend much more on defense' and 0 means 'government should spend much less on defense' where would you place yourself on this scale? Response categories: 0 -government should spend much more on defense, 1...10 -government should spend much less on defense.
Cut Taxes Versus Increase Spending on Social Services
Using the 0 to 10 scale below, where the end marked 0 means the U.S. government should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social services, and the end marked 10 means the U.S. government should raise taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social services, where would you place yourself on the scale? Response categories: 0 -government should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social services, 1...10 -government should increase taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social services. 4 On heuristics and decision-making in initiative and referendum settings, see Lupia (1994) ; Lupia and McCubbins (1998); Bowler and Donovan (1998); Clarke, Kornberg and Stewart (2004) .
Liberal-Conservative Scale
5 Voters' political attitudes and beliefs assist them in using heuristics. For example, they may compare their party identifications and ideological positions with those of proponents and opponents of a proposal (Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock, 1991) . More general psychological predispositions may be relevant as well. For example, as discussed above, it has been conjectured that widespread risk aversion is an important reason why initiative and referendum proposals frequently are defeated (e.g., Bowler and Donovan, 1998; Nadeau, Martin and Blais, 1999; Clarke, Kornberg and Stewart, 2004) . 6 A recent study of voting in Britain's 2011 national referendum on changing the electoral system presents empirical evidence consistent with this hypothesis. See Clarke et al. (2013 Vavreck and Rivers (2008) . For a recent mode-comparison analysis demonstrating the utility of high quality internet surveys, see Ansolabehere and Schaffner (2011) . Financial support for the present study was provided by the National Science Foundation (Grant #SES-1048117) and the University of Texas at Dallas. The authors wish to thank the NSF and UTD for their generous assistance. The survey data and supporting documentation will be placed on the authors' website to permit replication analyses. Obama's image is measured using a 0-10 affect scale. Circa October 2010, his average score was 4.6, down from the 5.1 he had recorded at the time of the 2008 presidential election. See Clarke et al. (2012) .
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Party contact is measured as two (0-1) dummy variables for contact by the Democrats and the Republicans. People not contacted by either party are the reference category. 24 Using "somewhat willing" (to take risks) or "don't know" responses as the reference category, 0-1 dummy variables are created for the "very willing (very risk acceptant)," "somewhat unwilling (somewhat risk averse)" and "very unwilling (very risk averse)" categories. 25 Unemployment status is a 0-1 dummy variable, with people stating that they were unemployed or temporarily laid off scored 1 and all other respondents scored 0. Age is age in years; educational level is a 0-6 variable ranging from high school education or less to graduate-level (MA, Ph.D) or professional (LLB, MD) degree; gender is a 0-1 dummy variable with men scored 1 and women, 0; annual family income is a 13-category degree ranging from 1 (under $20,000) to 13 ($250,000 or more) per year; and race/ethnicity is a series of 0-1 dummy variables for African-Americans, Hispanics and "Others" with Whites as the reference category. 26 Model parameters are estimated using Stata/MP 13.1's binomial probit program. 27 A proportional reduction in error statistic (Lambda) indicates that the model can reduce classification errors in referendum voting by 72% compared with a naive mode-guessing approach. 28 Opinions about Proposition 23 might influence candidate images and create a simultaneity bias in the vote model. To check this possibility, we re-estimated the model employing two-stage conditional maximum likelihood (Alvarez and Glasgow, 1999) . The test for simultaneity bias was statistically insignificant (B = .019, s.e. = .071, t = 0.27). 29 Probabilities are computed using the Clarify program (Tomz, Wittenberg and King, 1999) . Alternative scenarios using one or two standard deviation shifts in continuous variables yield the same substantive conclusions about the relative importance of various predictors. 30 Specifically, risk averse people are .16 points less likely to vote yes than risk acceptant individuals. Contacts by the Republican and Democratic parties change the probability of voting yes by .11 and .10 points, respectively. Differences across demographic groups are also modest-younger people and women are .16 and .06 points, respectively, less likely to vote yes, whereas Hispanics and those in the "other" race/ethnicity category are .08 and .16 points more likely than Whites to do so. 31 The 2010 PSA survey does not contain a measure of knowledge of the positions of the senatorial and gubernatorial candidates on Proposition 23. However, evidence from an earlier study in California by Karp (1998) as well as the British data cited in note 6 above strongly support the assumption that more knowledgeable voters are more likely to be aware of candidates' positions. See also Delli Carpini and Keeter (1997) . It bears emphasis that accurate perceptions of the candidates' positions on a ballot proposition are not required for voters for use candidate images as a heuristic. What is required is that voters think that they know where the candidates stand. 32 Eight factual statements are used to gauge levels of political knowledge. An additive index (range: 0 to 8) is constructed by calculating the number of correct answers. The mean number of correct answers is 
